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Farming has economic, political, and cultural importance virtually all 
across the globe. Over the last decade, foreign investment in agriculture 
has grown in size and scope, offering both benefits and drawbacks to 
nations that receive such investments. Where once uncommon, the 
European Union has begun to encounter more instances of foreigners 
acquiring farmland, particularly in Eastern Europe. With the growing 
popularity of Eurosceptic populism in Eastern Europe, some national 
governments have enacted laws that restrict foreign ownership of 
farmland but which conflict with EU free-trade principles. In light of 
current and developing problems facing Europe, it is important for the 
EU and its eastern members to reach a compromise that both recognizes 
and facilitates redress of the members’ concerns and reaffirms the liberal 
democratic traditions of European integration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The agriculture sector is of critical importance to the proper 
functioning of every country in the world.1 Farming is the foundation 
upon which civilization developed and provides a renewable source for 
the basic necessities of human life, along with other important public 
benefits.2 Accordingly, agricultural property can be a particularly 
valuable asset for numerous reasons.3 Thus, there is a strong incentive for 
public and private entities to invest in the agriculture and food 
production industry. With the expansion of international trade, the 
investments that were traditionally made within a country’s boundaries 
have extended to agricultural property within foreign borders, 
particularly developing nations with under-utilized but high-quality 
farmland.4 Such investments—termed Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDIs)—were primarily made by private investors; however, more 
recently, government actors have increasingly sought out larger scale 
FDI opportunities to secure access to food production and diversify 
investment assets in light of the rise in global food prices and worldwide 
market volatility.5 This new sort of investment has been described as 
“farmland grabbing.”6 
FDI in agriculture has been generally supported by international 
organizations, particularly the United Nations (UN), as a means of 
  
 1. See About FAO, FAO, http://www.fao.org/about/en/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2017). 
 2. The Development of Agriculture, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
https://genographic.nationalgeographic.com/development-of-agriculture/ (last visited Jan. 
11, 2017). 
 3. See generally HANCOCK AGRIC. INV. GRP., RESEARCH NOTE: BENEFITS OF 
FARMLAND INVESTMENTS (2011), http://hancockagriculture.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/Research_Note_-_Benefits_Of_Farmland_Investments_2011.pdf; 
Lori Lynch & Joshua M. Duke, Economic Benefits of Farmland Preservation: Evidence 
from the United States 1 (Univ. Md. Dep’t of Agric. & Res. Econ., Working Paper No. 
07-04, 2007). 
 4. Yannick Fiedler & Jesper Karlsson, Home Country Measures that Promote 
Responsible Foreign Investment: Evidence from Selected OECD Countries 1 (FAO 
Commodity & Trade Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 52, 2016). 
 5. Buying Farmland Abroad: Outsourcing’s Third Wave, ECONOMIST (May 21, 
2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13692889. 
 6. EUR. PARL., EXTENT OF FARMLAND GRABBING IN THE EU 11 (2015) 
[hereinafter EUR. PARL. STUDY]. 
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helping impoverished countries address hunger problems and develop 
their economies.7 However, recognizing the negative aspects of FDI in 
agricultural property and the potential for abuse, the UN and several 
other international organizations have developed principles to help guide 
and encourage responsible FDI transactions.8 While these guidelines 
primarily focus on improving the conduct of investors, they are voluntary 
and therefore not legally binding on either the investor or the host 
country.9 
The European Union (EU) meanwhile has found itself in a tough 
position over how to respond to foreign ownership of its members’ 
farmland. On the one hand, the purpose of the EU is to promote free 
trade and economic cooperation among its members; accordingly, its 
laws and policies disfavor restricting FDI, at least between its members.10 
On the other hand, evidence of farmland grabbing in the EU, especially 
within the EU’s Eastern European members, has raised concern among 
its old and new members about the fate of traditional European farming 
and prompted calls for the reform of EU law.11 Further complicating 
matters, populist movements across Europe, and the democratic world in 
general, are leading to laws reflecting a decline in globalism and 
increased apprehension over foreign ingression in domestic affairs.12 
Ultimately, the national laws of an EU country will determine 
whether and to what extent foreign entities can purchase interest in 
agricultural property. Given that FDIs pose potential negative 
implications on a host country’s sovereignty, particularly its control over 
  
 7. Fiedler & Karlsson, supra note 4, at vii. 
 8. See, e.g., COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SEC., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SYSTEMS (2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-
au866e.pdf [hereinafter RAI]; FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (FAO), VOLUNTARY 
GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND 
FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY iv (2012), 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf [hereinafter VGGT].  
 9. See VGGT, supra note 8, at 2. 
 10. See EUR. COMMISSION, SINGLE MARKET SCOREBOARD, INTEGRATION AND 
MARKET OPENNESS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 2013 – 2014 10 (2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/_docs/2017/fdi/2017-scoreboard-
fdi_en.pdf at 10 (2016); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., 1 OECD ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK NO. 73, SPECIAL FOCUS ON: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 169 (2003) 
[hereinafter OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK]. 
 11. See EUR. PARL. STUDY, supra note 6. 
 12. See id. at 11.  
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domestic food supplies, governments may be cautious to permit FDIs in 
their agricultural sector.13 That cautiousness is exacerbated in Eastern 
Europe, where the new members of the EU have struggled to reconcile 
their domestic policies—which were designed to keep their farmland 
locally owned—with the EU’s mandatory free trade laws and democratic 
principles.14 Combined with the concerns of the new members over 
losing their national identity, turmoil following Brexit, and expanding 
Russian hegemony, there is escalating tension between the EU and its 
newest members.15 Poland, in particular, epitomizes Eastern Europe’s 
political, economic, and legal situation and may offer an indication of 
where that region is headed. Elections in 2015 resulted in the installation 
of a populist government that quickly took steps to curb the ability of 
foreigners to acquire Polish farmland.16 Like similar laws effected by its 
neighbors, Poland’s law may impermissibly restrict the movement of 
capital within the EU17 and have serious economic consequences.18 More 
troubling is that the new law is susceptible to corruption and anti-
democratic abuse, especially given the government’s apparent disregard 
  
 13. FAO, TRENDS AND IMPACTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY AGRICULTURE: EVIDENCE FROM CASE STUDIES 339 (2013) [hereinafter TRENDS 
& IMPACTS STUDY]. 
 14. See Ben Margulies, Why Are So Many Liberal Democracies in Europe 
Struggling?, POLITICAL STUDIES ASS’N BLOG (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/why-are-so-many-liberal-democracies-europe-
struggling.  
 15. See Kate Connolly, The Eastern Countries Standing Up to Brussels in the 
Wake of Brexit, THE GUARDIAN (July 22, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/23/poland-czech-republic-hungary-
slovakia-brussels-brexit.  
 16. See Jan Cienski, Poland Raises Fences to Block Farmland Sales, POLITICO.EU 
(Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-raises-fences-to-block-farmland-
sales/.  
 17. Id.; European Commission Press Release IP/16/1827, Financial Services: 
Commission Requests Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia to Comply with 
EU Rules on the Acquisition of Agricultural Land (May 26, 2016) [hereinafter Financial 
Services]; European Commission Press Release IP/17/3901, Sales of Farmland: 
Commission Issues Guidelines to Member States (Oct. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Sales of 
Farmland]. 
 18. See generally Lukasz Lipinski, Polish Farmland Bill May Breach EU Law, 
EUOBSERVER (Apr. 14, 2016), https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/133035. 
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for the rule of law and its disrespect of EU institutions.19 Such laws thus 
threaten to undermine and reverse the democratization and liberalization 
of Eastern and Central Europe. 
Therefore, both the EU and its former-Soviet members should 
consider reforms to better protect against the potential problems of 
agricultural FDI while reaping its benefits. Broadly speaking, this paper 
argues that the efficacy of such efforts rests on both the EU imbuing its 
members with greater latitude to manage their land markets and members 
tailoring their internal policies to better reflect and affirm the EU’s free 
trade principles. Specifically, these reforms should also aim to address 
some of the more-legitimate public concerns that have led to the rise in 
populism throughout the western world while avoiding illiberal 
economic policy and anti-democratic laws. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Advantages of Domestic Farmland and the Benefits and 
Concerns over Foreign Agricultural Investment in Developing 
Democracies 
There are several compelling reasons for governments to protect, 
preserve, and invest in their farmland. The first and most apparent is to 
ensure that a country’s population has an accessible and sustainable 
supply of food.20 “Food security,” as it is known, is a paramount concern 
among governments across the world.21 In fact, the UN recognizes 
having access to adequate food as being a basic human right.22 Similarly, 
protecting domestic food supplies also serves a country’s national 
  
 19. See Marek Strzelecki, Defiant Poland Scoffs at EU Rebuke Over Eroding 
Rule of Law, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2016, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/poland-plots-endgame-in-
democracy-row-as-eu-obsesses-over-brexit; Steven Simmons, Constitutional Crisis in 
Poland, MICH. ST. U. INT’L L. REV. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.msuilr.org/msuilr-
legalforum-blogs/2017/8/17/constitutional-crisis-in-poland. 
 20. Food Security, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RESEARCH INST., 
http://www.ifpri.org/topic/food-security (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 21. Id. 
 22. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
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security interests.23 Not only does it provide the basic supplies to support 
a nation’s military, protecting a nation’s farmland also keeps at least 
some agricultural production within the influence of that nation’s 
domestic policy, mitigating reliance on foreign governments to feed its 
population.24 In times of international crisis or war, the extent of a 
nation’s ability to feed its population may very well determine the fate of 
that nation.25 
Economic incentives are also prevalent, considering that agriculture is 
a multi-trillion dollar industry worldwide with over one-third of the 
Earth’s labor force dependent upon it for employment to some extent.26 
While the agriculture sector in wealthier countries is a smaller economic 
contributor, it nevertheless continues to be an important component in 
those countries’ rural areas and bolsters international trade.27 
Additionally, agriculture has an important cultural element. Farming and 
farm ownership have provided, and continue to provide, people with the 
means to grow and prosper; subsequently, it reflects how a civilization 
developed and the national identity of that civilization’s people.28 For 
many it represents a “lifestyle based on beliefs and traditions about living 
and work.”29 
  
 23. See Press Release, House Comm. on Agric., Former Military Leaders 
Highlight the Importance of Agriculture and National Security (July 7, 2016), 
http://agriculture.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3480. 
 24. See Chris Arsenault, Global Dependence on Food Imports Leaves Countries 
Vulnerable, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-food-
trade-idUSKBN0M92CG20150313.  
 25. See Press Release, House Comm. on Agric., supra note 23. See, e.g., Roy 
Gutman, Assad Regime to Besieged Aleppo: Surrender or Starve, THE NATION (Sept. 2, 
2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/assad-regime-to-besieged-aleppo-surrender-or-
starve/.  
 26. See The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/xx.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2017). 
 27. See CAP at a Glance, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-
overview_en (last visited Feb. 9, 2017). Although agriculture accounted for 6% of EU 
GDP, it supports one of the largest employment sectors of the EU economy and 
constitutes a growing portion of EU exports. See id.; European Commission 
Memorandum MEMO/13/621, The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Agriculture 
in Europe – Frequently Asked Questions (June 26, 2013). 
 28. See Agricultural Heritage: A Legacy for the Future, FAO, 
http://www.fao.org/giahs/background/en/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).  
 29. Family Farming, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/family-
farming_en (last updated Feb. 02, 2017). 
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Finally, farmland and agricultural policy play an important role in 
environmental protection.30 This includes promoting biodiversity, 
enhancing water quality, controlling erosion, and managing wildlife.31 
Because farming can have significant negative effects on these aspects of 
the environment, governments may be compelled to encourage, 
discourage, or prohibit certain farming operations or techniques.32  
In light of these reasons, agriculture takes on a powerful political 
dimension as well, particularly in democratic societies where those 
impacted by agriculture may make up a substantial portion of the 
electorate.33 Thus, national governments may be compelled to initiate 
various efforts that safeguard property for agricultural uses and 
encourage methods of farming that maximize its value in a given 
community.34 A common approach is for governments to offer farmers 
financial incentives, like subsidies or tax breaks that are defined and 
tailored to address particular issues that farmers may face.35 Agricultural 
property owners may also be given special property rights or become 
eligible to receive special opportunities in connection with their 
ownership, such as the ability to transfer development rights to other 
properties so that the other properties may be further developed or the 
chance to sell development rights in exchange for money and lower 
property taxes.36 Zoning also plays a key role by setting forth and 
  
 30. See Integrating Environmental Concerns into the CAP, EUR. COMM’N, 
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/envir/cap_en (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 31. Sustainable Agriculture for Biodiversity – Biodiversity for Sustainable 
Agriculture, FAO, http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/85baf9c5-ea7f-4e25-812f-
737755a8b320/ (last visited Jan 11, 2018). 
 32. See, e.g., Integrating Environmental Concerns Into the CAP, supra note 30. 
 33. See Marc F. Bellemare & Nicholas Carnes, Why Do Members of Congress 
Support Agricultural Protection?, 50 FOOD POL’Y 20, 20−21 (2015); see, e.g., Eleanor 
Beardsley, In a Heated Campaign Season, French Politicians Flock to Paris Farm Fair, 
NPR (Mar. 1, 2017, 5:10 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/03/01/517882201/in-a-heated-campaign-
season-french-politicians-flock-to-paris-farm-fair.  
 34. See Bellemare & Carnes, supra note 33, at 20–21. 
 35. See, e.g., USDA, FARM AND RURAL TAX POLICY 1–2 (2013); CAP at a 
Glance, supra note 27; Property Taxes, MICH. FARM BUREAU, 
https://www.michfb.com/MI/Farm_Business_Resources/Natural_Resources_and_Enviro
nment/Property_Taxes/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). 
 36. See Transfer of Development Rights, PENN. LAND TR. ASS’N, 
http://conservationtools.org/guides/12-transfer-of-development-rights (last visited Feb. 
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delineating a community’s preference for agriculture in relation to other 
development; zoning laws may award farmland special protection.37 To 
address environmental concerns, policy initiatives may include financing 
the preservation of farmland to maintain wildlife habitat or encouraging 
certain plowing and fertilizing techniques to improve soil and water 
quality.38 In short, addressing the fate of farming and its impact on 
society is an active priority of governments across the world. 
As such, a growing concern for many nations recently is the 
increasing amount of investment by foreign entities into those nations’ 
farmland and means of agricultural production.39 While foreign 
investment in farmland is not new, the identity of investors and the size 
of acquisitions have changed in recent years.40 Where land investments 
used to be between private parties, more investments are now being 
pursued by foreign governments directly or through entities with close 
connections to those governments.41 These new investors have a different 
motivation from the financial incentives of private investors, namely 
their own food security.42 Additionally, transactions now involve much 
more land than what they used to, with the obvious result that these land 
deals place larger shares of the host country’s agricultural output directly 
into the hands and under the control of foreign governments.43 Moreover, 
the acquired lands are usually the best properties available for 
agricultural use.44 Exacerbating concerns is that in some cases, these 
  
20, 2017); CTR. FOR LAND USE EDUC., PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS: PURCHASE OF 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (PDR) (2006), https://www.uwsp.edu/cnr-
ap/clue/Documents/PlanImplementation/Purchase_of_Development_Rights.pdf. Both 
options generally offer some financial benefits to the property owner.  
 37. See DAVID KRUFT, AGRIC. LAW RES. & REF. CENT., DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW 
OF PENN. ST. UNIV., AGRICULTURAL ZONING 1−3 (2001); see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
286.471 (1981). 
 38. See, e.g., Financial Assistance, NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., USDA, 
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/ (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2017). 
 39. GRAIN, THE GLOBAL FARMLAND GRAB IN 2016: HOW BIG, HOW BAD? 3 
(2016), https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5492-the-global-farmland-grab-in-2016-
how-big-how-bad.pdf.  
 40. Buying Farmland Abroad, supra note 5. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. TRENDS & IMPACTS STUDY, supra note 13, at 335. 
546 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 26.3 
investors have imported farmers from their own countries rather than 
employ local help.45 Thus, such transactions have the potential to exploit 
a host country through the displacement of its people and the 
dispossession of its resources.46 
Nevertheless, foreign investment in agriculture is seen as carrying 
with it important benefits, particularly in developing countries.47 Most 
notably, it is “one [of] the most effective ways to reduce poverty and 
hunger” and thus promotes greater food security.48 Despite some 
investors eschewing local help, many in fact do employ the host 
country’s farmers and laborers.49 Foreign investment can also provide a 
host country with the ability to engage in more trade through access to 
foreign markets.50 Likewise, it may lead to greater production capabilities 
through the introduction of new technology and improvements in the 
host country’s infrastructure.51 Thus, nations that wish to improve the 
capabilities and efficacy of their agricultural industries may be drawn to 
foreign investment opportunities as a quick means to make up for lost 
development.52 
In setting policy and crafting law, democratic nations should therefore 
strike a balance between the pros and cons associated with foreign 
investment in agriculture while also remaining sensitive and accountable 
to the public sentiment toward such activity. 
B. International Responses to Foreign Agricultural Investment 
Generally, international organizations favor foreign agricultural 
investment for its potential to reduce world hunger and poverty.53 
However, the international community is not blind to the evident perils 
posed by FDI in farmland.54 Thus, a number of international 
organizations and interests—coordinated mostly through the UN—have 
  
 45. Buying Farmland Abroad, supra note 5. 
 46. TRENDS & IMPACTS STUDY, supra note 13, at 335. 
 47. Fiedler & Karlsson, supra note 4, at 1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See TRENDS & IMPACTS STUDY, supra note 13, at 323. 
 50. Fiedler & Karlsson, supra note 4, at 1. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Buying Farmland Abroad, supra note 5. 
 53. See Fiedler & Karlsson, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 54. Id. 
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collaborated to address the many political, legal, economic, cultural, and 
environmental issues that may be implicated when entities invest in the 
agricultural industries of other nations.55 
1. Guidance from the United Nations 
In response to the growing international concern over large scale 
foreign agricultural investing, the UN delved into the issue and 
developed several guidance documents to assist both investors and host 
countries in structuring investments so that the transactions are more 
likely to be done responsibly and to the parties’ mutual benefit.56 Two of 
these documents are of particular note. First are the Principles for 
Responsible Agricultural Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems 
(RAI).57 The RAI were developed by the UN’s Committee on World 
Food Security (CFS) in response to the emergence of farmland grabbing 
and the ensuing global concern.58 The RAI is based upon ten principles 
that broadly define acceptable standards of responsible foreign 
investment in agriculture.59 These suggest inter alia that, with respect to 
their effect on host countries, foreign investments should strengthen food 
security, be sensitive to cultural heritages, and promote transparent and 
accountable governmental oversight systems.60 Moreover, the guidelines 
place primary responsibility on national governments to ensure that 
policies are in place that ensure responsible investment.61 While the 
principles are regarded as soft law instruments, the RAI is nevertheless 
widely recognized due to the many interest groups that helped to develop 
it.62 
  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 2. 
 57. RAI, supra note 8. 
 58. Id. at 4. The RAI were derived from an earlier proposal by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and 
World Bank. Fiedler & Karlsson, supra note 4, at 28.   
 59. RAI, supra note 8, at 11–18. 
 60. Id. at 11, 15, 17–18. 
 61. Id. at 20–23. 
 62. Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, UN COMM. ON 
WORLD FOOD SEC., http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-home/activities/rai/en/ (last visited Feb. 
20, 2017). 
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Second, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN’s 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT) 
represent an “unprecedented international agreement” on land use.63 
Where the RAI broadly elaborates the ideals of responsible FDI, VGGT 
takes those ideals and provides suggestions on how they may be 
realized.64 It thus aims to “achiev[e] food security for all and to support . 
. . the right to adequate food in the context of national food security” by 
offering the many actors involved in FDI a “framework[] that can be 
used [for] developing strategies, policies, laws, programme[s] and 
activities.”65 Of central importance to these guidelines is the principle 
that “[s]tates should provide frameworks that are non-discriminatory and 
promote social equity.”66 
Given the transactional nature of FDI, significant attention is given to 
the transferability of property.67 Accordingly, “fair[, efficient,] and 
transparent sale and lease markets” on land use and ownership should be 
facilitated when appropriate, with special protection and support afforded 
to small-scale farming due to its “importance . . . [to] national food 
security and social stability.”68 Moreover, the guidelines encourage 
countries to collect and disseminate information related to land use and 
ownership publicly.69 The valuation methods a county uses for its land is 
also important; such methods should be fair, timely, transparent, in line 
with common international standards, and should consider non-economic 
values.70 
A significant issue that VGGT attempts to prevent is corruption.71 To 
this end, it advises generally that systems should be in place to monitor 
the actions of, and hold accountable, governmental and nongovernmental 
actors; public institutions should employ “transparent processes and 
decision-making;” and the development of anti-corruption policies 
  
 63. Voluntary Guidelines on Tenure, FAO, 
http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 64. See Fiedler & Karlsson, supra note 4, at 27–28. 
 65. VGGT, supra note 8, at preface. 
 66. Id. at 8. 
 67. See generally id. at 19–28. 
 68. Id. at 19, 20. 
 69. Id. at 9–11, 29–30. 
 70. Id. at 30–31. 
 71. See id. at 10, 14, 16, 17. 
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should be done consultatively and inclusively.72 More specifically, 
VGGT recommends “applying checks and balances, limiting the 
arbitrary use of power, addressing conflicts of interest and adopting clear 
rules and regulations” as methods of mitigating the risk of corruption.73 
On the topic of investments specifically, the VGGT encourages host 
countries to enact “safeguards to protect legitimate tenure rights, human 
rights, livelihoods, food security[,] and the environment from risks that 
could arise from large-scale transactions.”74 To detect any risks 
associated with these matters, it advocates for independent assessments 
of large-scale transactions prior to their consummation.75 Restrictions, 
such as placing limits on how many large-scale land transactions are 
allowed or the size of land transactions, may be permissible methods to 
address the negative aspects of agricultural FDI.76 
While the UN’s land tenure model may provide useful guidance to 
countries and foreign investors on how they should structure investments 
and acquisitions, the UN recognizes that several intrastate factors are of 
equal importance in ensuring that both parties reap the benefits of such 
investments.77 Of particular relevance is the legal framework that exists 
in a host country and that host country’s commitment to the rule of law.78 
To that point, the VGGT, for example, states that it “should be 
interpreted and applied consistent with existing obligations under 
national and international law[] and . . . in accordance with national legal 
systems and their institutions.”79 Furthermore, it recognizes the transient 
nature of politics and thus suggests that “[w]here the broader contexts 
change,” reforms to land policy should accord with the “national 
consensus.”80 
  
 72. Id. at 8–10. 
 73. Id. at 10. 
 74. Id. at 21. 
 75. Id. at 22. 
 76. Id. at 21. To this point, the VGGT recommends that states “define what 
constitutes large-scale transactions.” Id. 
 77. Trends and Impacts of Foreign Investment, FAO, 
http://www.fao.org/economic/est/publications/trends/en/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 78. Id. 
 79. VGGT, supra note 8, at 2. 
 80. Id. at 9. 
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C. Supranational and National Responses in Europe to Foreign 
Agricultural Investment 
Although largely ignored in the context of the international 
community’s concern, the prevalence and effects of agricultural FDI are 
growing in Europe.81 While the ability of some countries to address these 
concerns is fettered only by their own limitations, the majority of 
European states have fallen under the yoke of the EU’s limited 
supranational legal system as the bloc has continued to expand 
eastward.82 Accordingly, some of the traditional national policy decisions 
of its members are now made by or in conjunction with the EU, 
specifically those on matters related to economic, agricultural, and 
environmental law.83 Consequently, national laws that conflict with or 
operate within the same legal sphere as EU law may be limited or subject 
to preemption.84 Thus, some of the policy concerns associated with 
agricultural FDI fall within the EU’s prerogatives, requiring some action 
on its part to address them and raising the possibility that similar efforts 
by members will be in discordance with its laws.85 
1. Agricultural Policy and the Changing Political Landscape 
in the European Union 
The EU is in a somewhat unique position in regard to agricultural 
FDI. On one hand, arguably the most fundamental function of the EU is 
to encourage economic cooperation and decrease trade barriers among its 
  
 81. EUR. PARL. STUDY, supra note 6, at 17–18. 
 82. Enlargement, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/european-
union/topics/enlargement_en (last visited Jan. 11, 2017) (there are 44 countries in Europe 
and currently 28 EU members). While the EU is not strictly a supranational institution 
(its specific boundaries are difficult to define), the supranational elements of its 
legislative and legal system is what matters for the purposes of this paper. Izabela 
Kraśnicka, Associate Professor, Lecture at University of Białystok Faculty of Law (May 
31, 2016). 
 83. How the EU Works, DELEGATION OF THE EUR. UNION TO THE U.S., 
http://www.euintheus.org/who-we-are/how-the-eu-works/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 84. Id.; Kraśnicka, supra note 82. 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 41–51. 
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members.86 As such, restrictions imposed by members on the movement 
of capital between other members or non-EU countries are generally 
prohibited.87 Thus, should one member proscribe the citizens of other 
members from purchasing its land, EU law would ostensibly be violated 
and infringement procedures initiated.88 On the other hand, land—
particularly farmland—is a finite resource and “cannot be considered 
simply as an ordinary commodity.”89 Moreover, small farms are very 
important to European culture and economy, as they promote food 
security and sovereignty, help protect the environment, and sustain rural 
economies and cultures; conversely, the large commercial farms 
characteristic of FDI are more susceptible to market downturns, employ 
fewer laborers, are less productive, and have potential negative effects on 
the environment as a result of their farming practices.90 
In 2004, the European Council and European Parliament supported 
land policy guidelines that EU members should consider when investing 
in the property of developing countries.91 While the guidelines focused 
more on the responsibilities of EU members as the source of FDI, it 
acknowledged the role the guidelines could play in developing national 
land policy in Central and Eastern Europe.92 Moreover, in early 2015 the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) recommended that 
all EU members should implement the VGGT and report their use and 
application to both EU and UN bodies.93 While some guidelines have 
been adopted and followed by EU members to an extent, many do not 
  
 86. The EU in Brief, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-
in-brief_en (last visited Jan. 4, 2017). 
 87. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 63, May 9, 2008, 2008 
O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. However, an exception to this rule is that members 
may restrict the movement of capital if they can justify such restrictions “on grounds of 
public policy or public security.” Id. art. 65(1)(b). 
 88. See sources cited supra note 17.  
 89. EUR. PARL. STUDY, supra note 6, at 54. 
 90. See generally EUR. COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF CAP REFORM 2014–2020, (2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/policy-perspectives/policy-
briefs/05_en.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF CAP REFORM].  
 91. See generally EU TASK FORCE ON LAND TENURE, EU LAND POLICY 
GUIDELINES: GUIDELINES FOR SUPPORT TO LAND POLICY DESIGN AND LAND POLICY 
REFORM PROCESSES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2004). 
 92. Id. at 1, 12. 
 93. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Land Grabbing, 
¶ 1.13, 2015 O.J. (C 242) 16 [hereinafter EESC Opinion]. 
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necessarily recognize them when investing either outside or inside the 
EU.94 Thus, it is not surprising that in addition to adopting guidelines, the 
EESC suggested that member states should have more power to regulate 
their own land markets.95 
Nor does the EU itself apply any EU-wide statutory restrictions on 
FDI per se.96 In fact, consistent with its support of globalization, the EU 
encourages FDI generally and actively works to make EU markets and 
regulations more attractive to foreign investors.97 To a significant extent, 
the EU has, broadly speaking, benefited greatly from the foreign 
investments of its members, with trillions of dollars brought into their 
economies—and by extension the European Single Market—over the last 
decade.98 However, a significant portion of those inflows are the result of 
intra-EU FDI—largely realized from investments by wealthier EU 
members.99 Nevertheless, the EU undoubtedly benefits by promoting 
policies that keep its markets efficient and make it an attractive location 
for FDI.100  
Accordingly, the decisions of the European Court of Justice (EJC) 
uphold the preference for freer markets, including land markets, through 
the unrestricted movement of capital.101 While the Court acknowledges 
that under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
members have full control over their system of property ownership, the 
rules effecting such systems must nevertheless accord with other 
provisions of EU law.102 Specifically with the movement of capital, 
national laws regulating land must 1) “be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner;” 2) serve a substantial public interest; 3) be suited to attain that 
  
 94. See EU Policy, ACCESS TO LAND, http://www.accesstoland.eu/-EU-Policy- 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2017); Fiedler & Karlsson, supra note 4, at 16–17.  
 95. EESC Opinion, supra note 93, ¶ 6.10. 
 96. See Investment, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-
markets/investment/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).  
 97. See SINGLE MARKET SCOREBOARD, supra note 10. 
 98. STEFAN VETTER, DEUTSCHE BANK, RECENT TRENDS IN FDI ACTIVITY IN 
EUROPE 5 (2014). 
 99. See id. at 1, 5–8. 
 100. Id. at 8–10. 
 101. See, e.g., Case C-452/01, Ospelt v. Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung, 
2003 E.C.R. I-9743. 
 102. Opinion of AG Geelhoed, Case C-452/01, Ospelt v. Schlössle Weissenberg 
Familienstiftung, 2003 E.C.R. I-9743, ¶ 82. 
2018] Protecting Eastern Europe’s Farmland 553 
interest; and 4) “not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”103 
Discrimination in this respect refers to rules “which provide for different 
treatment on the basis of nationality.”104 The final prong, known as 
proportionality, though ostensibly interpreted flexibly by the courts, has 
also been applied more rigidly against member state action than EU 
action.105 
Thus, despite EU law generally proscribing the use of protectionist 
measures on the flow of capital by its members, there are to a limited 
extent barriers to agricultural FDI permitted and in place within some EU 
nations.106 Many of these restrictions are procedural rather than explicit 
prohibitions, making investment more difficult or impractical for foreign 
entities due to compliance requirements with regulatory agencies.107 
However, the trend since the end of the twentieth century has been the 
elimination of these barriers, with the EU now generally regarded as 
being among the least restrictive places for foreign investment in the 
world.108 Furthermore, FDI between member states is “almost completely 
unrestricted.”109  
That being said, EU policy is not unsympathetic to the interests of its 
developing members and their farmers. Instead of erecting barriers, the 
EU has taken the approach of bolstering its members’ family farms and 
agricultural capabilities through the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).110 While having undergone several reforms throughout its history, 
since 2013, the CAP operates under two interrelated pillars designed to 
promote “viable food production, sustainable management of natural 
  
 103. Id. ¶ 84.  
 104. Id. ¶ 124. 
 105. Valentina Vadi, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas to Regional and 
International Economic Law: The Case of Proportionality, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
557, 574–75, 577 (2015). However, EU courts have generally adapted the concept of 
proportionality to meet the needs of European integration. Id. at 577. 
 106. EUR. PARL. STUDY, supra note 6, at 59; see Press Release, Sales of Farmland, 
supra note 17. 
 107. See Thomas Wiedmann, Land Grabbing and Freedom of Investment 7, 
Presented at European Econ. & Soc. Comm. Public Hearing on Land Grabbing/Large-
scale Land Acquisitions (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/5-
presentation-wiedman_land-grabbing-and-freedom-of-investment.pdf; see, e.g., EUR. 
PARL. STUDY, supra note 6, at 59 (discussing the French SAFERs regulatory scheme). 
 108. VETTER, supra note 98, at 8–9. 
 109. OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 10, at 169. 
 110. CAP at a Glance, supra note 27.  
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resources and climate action[,] and balanced territorial development.”111 
The first pillar involves subsidies and price supports paid directly to 
farmers who meet certain conditions112 or where market conditions 
justify payments.113 The second is designed to encourage rural 
development through inter alia education, innovation, and risk-
management.114 While some of the tools under the CAP are compulsory, 
meaning they are available to farmers in all EU member countries, other 
support mechanisms are voluntary and may be adopted by member 
countries to tailor the CAP to their needs.115 
Although there is evidence of the CAP’s efficacy in the past,116 some 
of its measures have contributed to the emergence of large-scale FDI 
farms and the decline of Europe’s small farmers.117 Notably, the CAP as 
it existed prior to its 2013 reform premised direct payments to farmers 
inter alia on how much farmland they owned.118 As such, there arises an 
implication “that land is bought up for the sole use of accessing 
subsidies.”119 Thus, Farmers and investors had an additional incentive to 
buy larger parcels of farmland.120 
Additionally, other EU policies have encouraged large-scale FDI in 
farmland. Particularly, the EU’s 2009 Renewable Energy Directive 
  
 111. OVERVIEW OF CAP REFORM, supra note 90, at 1–2. 
 112. See Albert Massot, First Pillar of the CAP: II – Direct Payment to Farmers, 
EUR. PARL. (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.2.5.html.  
 113. See Guillaume Ragonnaud & Albert Massot, First Pillar of the CAP: I – 
Common Organisation of the Markets (CMO) in Agricultural Products, EUR. PARL. (Oct. 
2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.2.4.html.  
 114. See Guillaume Ragonnaud, Second Pillar of the CAP: Rural Development 
Policy, EUR. PARL. (2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.2.6.html.  
 115. See Agriculture and Rural Development, Direct Payments, EUR. COMM’N, 
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/direct-payments_en (last visited Jan. 5, 
2017). 
 116. See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N CAP IN YOUR COUNTRY: SPAIN 4–5 (Sept. 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/cap-in-your-country/pdf/es_en.pdf.  
 117. EUR. PARL. STUDY, supra note 6, at 30–31, 49–51 “The CAP . . . has clearly 
failed to live up to its declared objectives to keep people in farming and on the land and 
to promote a balanced territorial development.” Id. at 50.  
 118. Id. at 31.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 33. 
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pushed many new investors to begin buying up land for bioenergy 
purposes.121 This has resulted in an increasing amount of Europe’s 
limited farmland being converted from food production to energy 
crops.122 Furthermore, by expanding the commercial usefulness of 
farmland beyond food production, bioenergy production has driven up 
land prices and driven out small and entrepreneurial farmers.123 
In response to the growing concern across the EU, the European 
Parliament completed a study in 2015 analyzing the scope of farmland 
acquisition by foreigners among its member states and offering 
suggestions for how the EU should address the negative aspects of it.124 
The study first noted that while FDI “is a limited but creeping 
phenomenon in the EU,” it has been increasing quickly in Eastern 
Europe over the last decade.125 However, it is difficult to determine the 
actual figures of FDI due in part to a lack of record-keeping in some 
countries, minimal concern and data collection by international 
organizations on FDIs in Europe, and in some instances the foreign 
elements of land deals being disguised to protect party confidentiality or 
circumvent laws.126 Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence that 
geographically larger and democratically younger countries like Poland 
and Hungary are experiencing most of the EU’s FDI activity.127  
The study also pointed out a number of unique interests that are 
behind many of the acquisitions in Eastern Europe. These include 
holding companies owned by investors from Far Eastern, Middle 
Eastern, and Western powers and a broad variety of investment funds 
seeking asset diversification in response to the financial crisis of 2008.128 
Domestic interests, which include both local entrepreneurs and 
government actors, also play an important role in facilitating these 
transactions by providing financial or political support and mediating 
deals.129 A troubling, though unsurprising result of the involvement by 
  
 121. Id. at 36. 
 122. Id. at 37. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1. 
 125. Id. at 17, 20–22. 
 126. See id. at 17–20. 
 127. See id. at 20. 
 128. Id. at 22–23.  
 129. Id. at 23. 
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these domestic actors is that illicit and corrupt practices are sometimes 
employed to entice and complete transactions.130 
Following this information, the study goes on to make several 
recommendations to ameliorate the problem of farmland grabbing.131 
With respect to the CAP, it suggests that members use the existing 
framework to financially bolster small-scale farming and that further EU-
level reforms be similarly tailored.132 Furthermore, the authors of the 
study argue that because land can have transnational implications and is 
a unique commodity, the EU should play a greater role in land 
management through environmental policy.133 The study also suggests 
that the EU—via the EJC—be more accommodating to member-imposed 
impediments on FDI, favorably noting some members’ use of preemptive 
rights to allow governments greater control over acquisitions and the 
efforts of “civil society led initiatives” in promoting small-scale 
farming.134 Moreover, it advocates that the EU should develop “new data 
collecting instruments” to create a “pan-European and socially relevant 
database on the state of the land in Europe.”135 Finally, it echoed the 
EESC by advising the use of the VGGT as a reference point for further 
reforms.136 
Ultimately, the situation presents an existential problem for EU 
farming in that large-scale FDI farm acquisitions threaten to destroy 
Europe’s traditional family farm system by squeezing out existing small 
farmers and precluding new ones from taking their place.137 As more 
property is bought up for large-scale farming (or in some cases converted 
to non-agricultural uses), the availability of agricultural property is 
diminished and prices for the remaining farmland are pushed up with 
more and more small farms selling or losing their land as a result of their 
financial constraints and inability to compete with larger operations.138 
Additionally, prospective farmers are likely to lack the capital necessary 
  
 130. Id. at 23, 26. 
 131. Id. at 49. 
 132. See id. at 51–54. 
 133. Id. at 54–55. 
 134. Id. at 58–60. 
 135. Id. at 61. 
 136. Id. at 62. 
 137. Id. at 39–40. 
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to acquire small farms.139 This can leave rural communities financially 
and culturally depressed.140 Moreover, once the transition from small-
scale to large-scale farming has occurred, it is apparently very difficult to 
reverse.141 
The EU’s trouble with FDI is compounded by a political shift across 
Europe—as well as Western democratic societies worldwide—toward 
more populistic ideologies.142 Fueled by dissatisfaction with globalist 
trade policies that are seen as only benefiting the wealthy and apparent 
disconnect between policymakers and segments of the population, many 
Europeans are turning to fringe parties, or conversely, mainstream parties 
are reforming their policies to court those disaffected voters.143 However, 
the movement does not necessarily implicate the traditional shift along 
the left-right political spectrum; rather, it is a challenge to liberalization 
generally, in some cases invoking the specter of past greatness that 
allegedly existed in far less democratic days of old.144 Accordingly, 
European populists are showing distrust or outright hostility toward 
European integration under the EU, favoring more protectionist and 
nationalistic policies, both politically and economically.145 With the 
election of populists in some EU member countries, these policies are 
beginning to be reflected in national laws throughout the EU.146 
  
 139. See id. at 39–41. 
 140. Id. at 45. 
 141. Id. at 43–46. 
 142. See generally Gerald F. Seib, Behind the Rise of Populism, Economic Angst, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-the-rise-of-populism-
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 143. Seib, supra note 142. 
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Valuables, CNN (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/europe/denmark-vote-
jewelry-bill-migrants/. 
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Fundamentally then, this growing political trend stands in stark 
contrast to the free trade principles upon which the EU, and indeed the 
western world, has prospered over the last century.147 Thus, while EU 
leaders attempt to take action on issues facing their bloc of nations, they 
must do so against a political current that is antithetic to the function and 
purpose of the EU.148 
While perhaps not at the forefront of this clash between liberal and 
populist ideologies, policy decisions regarding the agricultural sector are 
closely implicated in the rise of populism in Europe. Agricultural policy 
in general tends to directly affect the segment of the population that is 
fueling the populist movements, namely those living in rural areas, the 
working poor, and the less educated.149 Furthermore, agricultural policy 
in the context of foreign investment invokes several of the main policy 
concerns of the populist movement: influx of foreign interests (notably in 
the form of immigration), free trade, and loss of national identity.150 In 
the EU, where approximately 44 million people are employed in 
connection to agriculture—making it the bloc’s largest labor sector—the 
effect of the CAP on its members’ political, economic, and cultural 
structures should be evident.151 
  
 147. Anti-globalists: Why They’re Wrong, ECONOMIST (Oct. 1, 2016), 
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2. Agricultural Policy and the Political Shift in Poland and 
Eastern Europe 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly-liberated 
European states began eyeing membership in the EU.152 Notably, four 
countries—Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia—banded 
together to form the Visegrad Group (V4) with the objective of hastening 
acceptance into the bloc.153 From the eventual success of the V4 and thus 
the EU’s subsequent expansion eastward, vast swaths of previously 
unavailable agricultural property began to attract the attention of both EU 
and international investors.154 
Because of their relatively weak economies and inexpensive property 
(as compared with the older EU members), the new eastern members 
feared that their means of domestic agriculture production would be 
bought up by farmers from Western Europe, leaving locals with 
diminished farming opportunities.155 Accordingly, many of the new EU 
members negotiated to include in their EU accession agreements a 
moratorium on the sale of farmland to foreign investors.156 It was hoped 
that restricting foreign acquisition of land would provide adequate time 
for the Eastern European economies to mature and land prices to align 
with those in Western Europe, thereby removing the financial incentive 
of opportunistic investors.157 
However, the events of 2008 severely changed the outlook for the 
EU’s Eastern members. First, the global financial crisis impeded the 
economic improvement of Eastern Europe.158 Second, food prices 
skyrocketed, causing nations dependent upon importing food to begin 
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searching outside their borders for opportunities to secure food 
sources.159 Due to clever and motivated investors who were able to 
exploit loopholes in the law, the land sale moratoriums under the 
accession agreements appear to have had little effect in preventing 
Eastern European farmland from ending up under the control of 
foreigners.160 Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of these investors are from 
wealthier EU countries like Germany and Denmark.161 
Moreover, where the new members—particular those comprising the 
V4—once actively sought to adopt the liberal democratic principles of 
the EU, some governments have begun to exhibit authoritarian 
tendencies.162 With respect to the V4, its mission has changed following 
accession to the EU.163 For instance, V4’s efforts lately have sought to 
bolster the national power of its members and encourage the EU to give 
member states a “strong say in the decision-making process.”164 Critics 
have suggested that because of these internal shifts, the Eastern 
members’ new policy positions have become more economically 
restrictive and therefore inapposite to EU policy.165 Thus sentiment on 
  
 159. Id. 
 160. See EUR. PARL. STUDY, supra note 6, at 19–20. 
 161. Id. It is apt to note that Northern and Western European members of the EU, 
Germany in particular, are regarded as wielding much of the economic and political 
power in the EU. See What Some Europeans See When They Look at Germany, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:28 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-
power-in-the-age-of-the-euro-crisis-a-1024714.html.  
 162. See, e.g., Margit Feher & Veronika Gulyas, Putin’s Hungary Visit Aimed at 
Cementing Ties with Orban, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/putins-hungary-visit-aimed-at-cementing-ties-with-orban-
1486072262; Hands Off Their DNA: Huge Protests Force Romania’s Government to 
Reverse Itself on Corruption, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2017) 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21716570-decree-would-pardon-crooked-
officials-dropped.  
 163. The Bratislava Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on the Occasion of 
the 20th Anniversary of the Visegrad Group, VISEGRAD GRP. (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/the-bratislava [hereinafter Bratislava Declaration]. 
 164. Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries, VISEGRAD 
GRP. (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-of-
the-160919. 
 165. Illiberal Central Europe: Big, Bad Visegrad, ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21689629-migration-crisis-has-given-unsettling-
new-direction-old-alliance-big-bad-visegrad.  
2018] Protecting Eastern Europe’s Farmland 561 
both sides is deteriorating, with new conflicts emerging between the EU 
and its Eastern members.166 
Recent legislation enacted in Poland provides a great example of 
Eastern Europe’s reaction to the threat of foreign ownership of farmland 
and the populist movement within the EU.167 Compelled by the interests 
of many Polish farmers, the Polish parliament passed an act on April 14, 
2016, which entered into force the day before Poland’s moratorium on 
farmland sales under the terms of its EU accession agreement expired.168 
While ostensibly placing formidable restrictions on the ability of 
foreigners to hold agricultural properties in Poland, the act also makes it 
significantly more difficult for Polish citizens to acquire farmland.169 
The new law has several components. First, it limits the sale of 
farmland to “individual farmers” who receive permission from the 
government in exchange for agreeing to certain conditions.170 Individual 
farmers are defined as natural persons with farming qualifications and 
existing legal title to agricultural property who have lived and managed 
farmland for five years in the particular municipality where the property 
is located.171 Furthermore, an individual farmer cannot own more than 
300 hectares of farmland.172 A farmer who wishes to sell to an 
unqualified buyer (i.e., not an individual farmer) must first gain approval 
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from Poland’s Agricultural Property Agency (APA).173 Likewise, most 
business entities may purchase farmland only upon approval and the 
issuance of a permit by the APA.174 
Second, the law requires that the purchasing farmer not sell or lease 
the acquired property for ten years after it is acquired; additionally, the 
purchasing farmer must personally use the property as farmland during 
that time.175 However, under extraordinary circumstances, the farmer 
may be granted a release from these obligations by the courts.176 
Third, the Act subjects potential acquisitions of farmland to a review 
by the APA, which will also have the power to purchase the property for 
itself at market price.177 This preemptive right also includes transactions 
involving the transfer of shares by companies that own farmland.178 
Similarly, the APA also has a right to purchase agricultural property in 
several situations where a change in ownership occurs for reasons other 
than a sale.179 Notably, such situations may arise in relation to decisions 
by a court or other public authority.180 The price paid by the APA is 
“estimated according to the regulations on real estate management . . . 
with the participation of a property valuer,” which is seen by some as the 
government essentially setting its own price.181 However, the APA loses 
these preemptive rights once it consents to the transaction.182 
Finally, under the Act, the sale of all farmland owned and managed by 
the government is suspended for five years.183 This will keep the nearly 
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1.5 million hectares of agricultural property that the APA currently 
manages in public hands at least until that point.184 
The new law applies to “all agricultural properties located in Poland 
regardless of the legal title to the property of the eligible party.”185 This 
includes any arable land that may be used for agricultural purposes even 
if that land is not or has not previously been used for farming.186 
However, some agricultural properties are excluded, such as properties 
that are less than 0.3 hectares and properties that contain a residence 
under 0.5 hectares.187 Moreover, transfers to some persons and entities 
are exempt from the purchase requirements and the government’s 
preemptive rights on sales, including: close relatives of the seller; heirs 
and devisees; local governments; Poland’s Treasury or APA; and 
religious institutions, particularly the Catholic Church.188 Similar 
exceptions apply to the APA’s preemptive rights for non-sale transfers, 
and also include situations where the transfer expands a family farm to 
less than 300 hectares.189 
The implications of the new law are several. Most apparent is that 
fewer farmland transactions are likely to occur, destabilizing Poland’s 
agricultural property market.190 Accordingly, property values are likely to 
become opaque and uncertain, with many of the traditional methods of 
valuation becoming unsuited for the task.191 Similarly, because most of 
Poland’s land is classified as agricultural, the Act will presumably make 
the process of buying and converting land for non-agricultural purposes 
more difficult and costly.192 In addition, the new law drastically reduces 
Polish property rights and, stemming from the government’s valuation 
methods and preemptive rights, increases the chances of political 
corruption.193 Finally, the Act may fail to comply with EU law.194 The 
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European Commission (EC)—which initiates infringement proceedings 
on behalf of the EU195—recently found laws enacted by other Eastern 
members concerned with the acquisition of farmland to be both 
disproportionate to achieving the members’ objectives and 
discriminatory toward other EU members.196 Specifically, the 
Commission faulted the other laws for requiring buyers to be “long-term 
residents in the country,” prohibiting legal entities from acquiring 
farmland, setting farmer qualification standards for buyers, and 
obligating buyers to personally farm the land.197 Thus, Poland’s law may 
likewise be a “restriction to the free movement of capital and freedom of 
establishment.”198 This could set the stage for yet another conflict 
between Poland and the EU.199 
III. ANALYSIS 
Although the clash between the EU and its Eastern Members’ 
farmland policies is largely overshadowed by other issues facing the 
region,200 it nevertheless presents an untenable situation for the EU.201 
Reforms should thus be considered by both the EU generally and its 
members individually. For the EU, this means ceding some powers back 
to its members and reevaluating the methods it uses to advance farming 
under the CAP. With respect to the members, efforts to better collect data 
on FDI in their countries and encourage free market methods of 
preserving small, family farming would further their objectives; as such, 
members should endeavor to recognize and accord their policies with the 
liberal democratic values that the EU represents. The suggestions below 
should neither be considered an exclusive or exhaustive solution, but 
rather concepts that demonstrate the existence of liberal solutions which 
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are thus more appropriate to address the issues facing Eastern European 
EU members and their tension with the EU. 
A. EU Reforms 
Given that the CAP is the most significant aspect of the EU’s 
agriculture policy and has a financial impact on members’ farmers, it 
presents an opportunity to effect change of the members’ laws and 
influence their people directly. Moreover, through its interpretation and 
enforcement of its treaties, the EU’s discretion is not insignificant when 
it comes to defining the boundaries of national and supranational 
competences. Thus, two areas where changes may be helpful are in 
policies related to how and to what end the EU incentivizes farmers, and 
the extent to which EU members’ may regulate their agricultural 
property. 
1. Change How the CAP Incentivizes and Educates Farmers 
While the concept of the CAP is generally considered to be successful 
since its inception, the policy nevertheless continues to require tweaking 
in reaction to economic and political changes.202 As the EU embarks on 
further adjustments to the CAP, it has the opportunity then to implement 
reforms that contemporaneously address the concerns of Eastern 
Europe.203 With its control over the purse strings, the CAP poses a 
powerful tool to steer reforms within member states.204 To that point, 
some portion of CAP payments could be made conditional upon 
members adhering to and demonstrating compliance with basic 
requirements that generally further free market principles.  
Such action would serve two important interests. First, conditioning 
payments on members’ willingness to actively support liberal interests 
would place political pressure on populist governments to temper their 
anti-trade policies from both the EU and the farming community reliant 
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on such payments.205 Giving farmers and rural voters a financial 
incentive to eschew populism thus undercuts a substantial base of 
support for the populist politicians.206 Second, conditional CAP payments 
could presumably ease concerns that the EU may have in permitting 
members to implement greater barriers to their farmland markets because 
the EU would still retain its persuasive financial power.207 Though 
members would have the ability to ultimately enact restrictions contrary 
to the conditions, they would do so at significant political and financial 
peril.208 
Another opportunity to address some of the underlying issues of 
populism is through education funding under the CAP. Although part of 
the EU’s mission under the CAP is to encourage innovation in 
agriculture,209 it still seems to treat farming as something based more on 
pastoral ideals and traditions rather than a profession suited for 
modernization or formal education.210 Moreover, one of the predominant 
factions driving European populism is less educated voters from 
predominately agricultural areas.211 Thus, should farming be treated more 
as a hard science deserving of a university level education and were the 
EU to offer financial incentives through the CAP for such education, 
some of the aforementioned voters would likely become more educated 
and presumably less agreeable with the ideas effused by populism. 
While the concept of farmers utilizing hard science in farming may be 
associated with the image of America’s giant agri-corporations and 
commodification of farming (and thus inconsistent with the ideals of 
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European farming),212 adopting a more scientific, researched based 
education to the practice of farming should not necessarily predicate a 
move toward large-scale commercial farming.213 In fact, maintaining 
Europe’s system of small farms could offer numerous de facto 
laboratories on which to test and improve the outputs of different 
farming methods and thus bettering the agriculture sector as a whole.214 
2. Permit Member States to Exercise Greater Control Over 
Their Farmland 
As one of the main issues between the EU and its eastern members is 
the perceived intrusion by the EU into their national identities, rather 
than expand its role,215 the EU should allow its members to exercise a 
greater degree of sovereignty to address farmland grabbing.216 Although 
EU law limits the extent to which members may restrict the movement of 
capital, it nevertheless contains exceptions to those limitations.217 
Moreover, there appears to be recent softening by the EU legislative 
bodies where it comes to the EU’s exclusive position in regulating 
capital related to agriculture, thus opening the door to members being 
able to play a greater role in agricultural markets.218 Although EU law as 
written and generally recognized by the courts imposes significant 
obstacles on members seeking to restrict FDI in agricultural land 
markets, the EU’s judicial system seems to exhibit fluidity in its 
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interpretations when it appears appropriate to ameliorate the growing 
pains associated with the process of European integration.219 
Such a shift in policy may not require much in terms of actual 
changes to EU law or its treaties. Rather than pursuing the suggestion in 
the European Parliament Study calling for the EU’s courts to be more 
lenient when dealing with members’ restrictions on land markets, a 
change could be implemented earlier on in the process whereby the EC 
simply chooses to not bring infringement procedures against some 
national laws restricting farmland acquisitions that pose potential 
violations of EU law.220 This is not to say that the EC should ignore such 
potential violations altogether. Instead, for an appropriate time it could 
merely relax its enforcement, targeting only the more egregious 
violators. Moreover, changing enforcement policy would ostensibly be 
less unusual than a conscious decision by the court system to reinterpret 
legal principles.221 
Conversely, the EU could consider taking a somewhat simpler—
though perhaps more blunt and extraordinary—approach of entering into 
new agreements with some of its Eastern members to reinstate their 
previous land sale moratoriums for a reasonable amount of time.222 
Considering that many of the new members arguably did not receive the 
benefit of their moratoriums due to the 2008 financial crisis and 
motivated loophole-exploiting investors, new moratoriums would 
ostensibly be justified in order to correct the unanticipated problems that 
occurred under the previous ones.223 Furthermore, the moratoriums could 
be conditioned on members creating and implementing a satisfactorily 
liberal democratic regulatory framework for once the stay has ended.224 
Additionally, such a measure would temporarily remove a present, 
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though lesser point of political contention, and allow the EU time to 
focus on more pressing problems.225
B. National Reforms 
Reforms at the EU level, however, can only go so far. Ultimately, the 
efficacy and willingness of national actors will be a main determinant of 
the extent to which agricultural FDI will be regulated and EU principles 
upheld.226 While ostensibly members will have greater latitude to enact 
stronger rules related to agricultural acquisitions given the EU 
concessions suggested, they would do well to keep in mind the economic 
benefits that FDI and, more generally, EU membership offers.227 Thus, 
members should also aim to structure any such regulations with an eye 
toward promoting liberal democratic principles in the long run, 
specifically by strengthening the private property rights of their citizens 
and ensuring that their regulatory structures are transparent. 
1. Stronger Property Rights and Benefits for Natural Persons
Thus far, the methods pursued to curtail large-scale farmland FDI by 
eastern EU members have taken a decidedly restrictive angle.228
However, rather than a limitation-based approach to protecting the 
property interests of farmers, measures that both strengthen private 
property rights and offer incentives based on those rights would be more 
closely aligned with the liberal democratic principles of the EU.229
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Given that large-scale FDI acquisitions are often effected by 
conglomerations, as a preliminary matter laws would do well to 
recognize that fact.230 Therefore, members could enact regulations that 
distinguish between natural and legal persons for purposes of land 
acquisition.231 These would provide governments greater ability to limit 
acquisitions by the usual perpetrators of large-scale FDI while making 
acquisitions by those typically engaged in small-scale farming, such as 
individuals, less restricted. Disclosure requirements could also be 
tailored so that such rules are not susceptible to the work-arounds that 
enabled acquisitions to occur under the new member’s accession 
agreements.232 So long as the regulations fail to make differentiations 
based on an entity’s national origin and do not outright prohibit the sale 
to legal entities, they would appear to satisfy the non-discrimination 
requirement of the European courts and avoid EU scrutiny.233 
As for property rights specifically, rules could be enacted to recognize 
farm sizes within a certain acreage and owned by natural persons as 
“family farms.” Tax laws could then be amended to provide owners of 
such properties tax benefits—credits, deductions, etc.—thus reducing 
some of the financial burden that small-scale farmers face and making 
them more competitive with large-scale farming.234 Moreover, once a 
property has been designated a family farm, laws could serve to make it 
more difficult to rezone such farms for other uses or to zone adjacent 
properties with uses incongruent to agriculture.235 While such restrictions 
may impact the transferability of the farm, and thus its value, the tax 
implications could accordingly be adjusted by regulators so as to 
counterbalance the negative effects.  
Similarly, member countries could encourage agricultural 
conservation efforts.236 This could be done primarily by recognizing tax 
breaks for agricultural properties of a certain size where the farmer has 
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sold development rights to a public or private conservation entity.237 In 
addition to accomplishing the government’s apparent purpose of 
lessening the hardships that drive small-scale farmers off their lands, 
such measures could also propagate a synergistic industry based on the 
preservation of farmland.238 Additionally, or conversely, national 
governments could consider imbuing small-scale farmers with the ability 
to transfer development rights.239 Not only would such rights be valuable 
to those farmers, thus encouraging them to retain and use their 
properties, the development transfers could help supplement the CAP’s 
objectives by being channeled into the farmers’ communities in order to 
spur rural development and create jobs.240 
2. More Public Oversight and Transparency on Land 
Transactions with Foreign Entities 
Given the lack of information and transparency over FDI in Europe, 
the creation of public oversight and data-collection systems may well be 
the most important reform members can implement.241 At the very least, 
gathering information is a key first step toward developing more 
comprehensive policies on FDI and farmland.242 While the European 
Parliament Study favors establishing an EU-wide reporting 
mechanism,243 there are more potential benefits and opportunities if the 
EU (while remaining insistent) were to instead defer to its members to 
implement national systems.  
First, the EU’s insistence could be aided by financial incentives (or 
conversely penalties) to implement reporting requirements that gather the 
basic information sought by the EU.244 Second, this would give national 
governments the ability and some discretion to adjust their requirements 
to focus on and root out particular information with which their nations 
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may be interested, such as exploitative investors.245 Third, publicly 
disseminating information related to farmland transactions could help 
ameliorate some of the concerns associated with valuation that FDI 
restrictions may impose.246 Specifically, disclosure of price information 
would enable the public to make sure any land deals conducted by their 
government were for a reasonable value and allow the market to evaluate 
such transactions in comparison to others.247 Finally, public oversight and 
transparency is simply akin to good democratic government.248 Not only 
would such initiatives encourage beneficial investing by more 
responsible investors,249 they may also be regarded as a measure of good 
faith by the EU, thus further supporting its concessions.250 
Unfortunately, it appears that there is a tendency among Eastern 
European governments to eschew oversight. For example, Poland’s 
government is generally becoming more secretive and actively curtailing 
efforts to increase public transparency,251 Romanian officials recently 
attempted to quietly undermine public corruption laws,252 and Hungary’s 
Prime Minister appears to relish Russian authoritarianism.253 Thus, it 
remains to be seen whether the additional financial incentives and 
ancillary political pressure will be enough to alter that tendency. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While foreign investment in agriculture is not a new phenomenon, the 
increasing size of transactions and the expansion of its scope into the EU 
adds another wrinkle for national and international governments to 
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consider. The rise in Eurosceptic populism across the EU makes 
addressing large-scale agricultural FDI more challenging at both the 
national and supranational levels. Thus, land grabbing and the associated 
negative aspects of it, in particular the economic consequences, present 
real and continuing political and legal challenges for the EU and its 
Eastern European Members. 
Without placating to the more illiberal elements of the populist 
movement in Europe, the EU should consider reforming its agricultural 
policy to better promote and incentivize farming in the EU and allow its 
members greater ability to address farmland grabbing. Additionally, it is 
in the best interests of member states, particular those in Central and 
Eastern Europe, to identify and record the extent of agricultural FDI 
within their borders and take measures that protect the rights and 
livelihoods of their farmers while simultaneously continuing to promote 
the EU’s liberal democratic principles. Whether the EU will capitulate to 
these reforms and whether Eastern European governments will 
responsibly utilize any new discretion in accordance with liberal 
principles is yet to be determined. However, in light of the larger 
problems facing Europe, both parties would be wise to amicably 
ameliorate this situation in favor of a more united, democratic Europe. 
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